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Medical expertise is a subject of interest for clinical teachers. W a r  
makes a person an expert in this domain, and what is the best way to pre- 
pare students to became an expert? Naive opinions hdd that medical 
expertise is associated with howledge, experience, and g d  (that is 
quick, efficient and straight forward) problem solving. Until recently 
medical teachers and investigators in this domain believed that differences 
in problem-solving skills determined whether or not someone was an ex- 
pert. Hawever, both research into medical education and into human 
cognition have show that this is no fruitful approach. 'Therefore the fwus 
of attention has shifted toward differences in knowledge charactefisltics 
between persons of contrasting levels of e.xpehsie pG~aining to &ffleminc:&:s 
in problem-solving. In this approach the concept 'internal repsentadon" 
or 'problem representation' plays ;a pivotal role. Relevant problem infor- 
mation is selected md elabioirimted on, applying general or specific howl-  
edge. The internal representation constitutes both selected and inferred h- 
formation as w d l  as activated bowledge. 
The general research question of this dissertation W a t t  is medical ex- 
pertise?' can be refomutlated into two suhuiesdons:: 'What characterizes 
the h ~ w l e d g e  of the medical expert as ieompwed with novices and inter- 
mediates?kd 'EIow dms the developmental prwiess take place?', Sar the 
f i s t  chapter these questions are further ithvesti$atl;d and positioned in a 
historical context. In the same chapter the empirical methods that can be 
applied in this kind of research are des;csibed. 
In Chapter 2 the fmt  experiment is presented. ]Err thig study a fier= re- 
call m e t h d  was utilized to investigate the in tmd repa'eantahon of a c h i -  
eal case. Sixty-four subjects differing in level of experhe (second year, 
fourth yea  and fifth year students and family physicims) participated. 
This experiment showed that an inmasing level sf ex % i% associated 
with better &ramastic ~ ~ e e .  Fmh mme, in the f ~ s t  s ages of the 
development of expertise, the amount of r e p m n t d  case items inmeases, 
whereas in the later stages these items we better inteptled and are. repre- 
sented in a more cahe:mnt way. The results suggest that the more expfi- 
e n c d  subjects select relevant informa~an better, a d  finally it was: shown 
that higher levels of expertise we asswiataed. with a faster represenmtion 
rat& 
In C h a p ~ r  3 &is last result wm taken as a starting p i n t  m investigate 
wheher affmencets in kanowldge smcmlie, rklrtdmfie the observed differ- 
enms in iinkmd represenmian md diapa~h: p e r f a m e .  
Bath Anderson (1 983) and Nomm and Rumelhm (197 8) suppse 
that expertise is attained by zrpplfiag uhe I e m d  concepts. aovcrldge 
appllrca~an canm a stm chmge: long ~ m h  paths are s h e 1 1 4  md 
genmd hiowledge becomes Erpidizd. This process is called 'campila- 
xionYAnderson, 1983). Due to these stmcturd changes, expert knowl- 
edge illpplicationr is vesy quick md automatic when diagnosing a clinical 
caw, Novioes and i n t m d a t e s ,  however, apply their knowledge actire- 
By, li3.Mously aura consciously while reasoning a b u t  a case. 
If this developmenM process is indeed taking place, thein a drastic re- 
striction of the available reading; time will have substiintiall cmsquences 
on the novices' and Intemdiates' problem representation, whereas the 
experts' ~.epr@sentatiorr will ~~;arcelely suffer. In Experiment 2 this prdic- 
tion was tested and conr ' i ed  by the data. One hundred and twenty 
subjects participated in  this experiment: lay people, second, fourth and 
sixth year medical students mdcintemists. The expfis"tema1 represen- 
tation was not affmted by a smng restsictian ion the allowed reding h e ,  
while the novices' md irateme&atesbepresentadon was seriously ham- 
pered. The same holds for the amount af knowledge that was activated. 
Regmdbss'of 'the annount of time available (ample, w=cient lor extremely 
short) experts mivated the same small amaunt of knowledge, whereas 
novices md intemdiates activated much more knowledge when they had 
ample or sufficient time. These subjects also lacdvatd much less howl- 
edge when there was little dme allowed. Content analysis of the applied 
knowledge provided further evidence for the assumption that the eulier 
stages of a learning procesls in a domdn are characterized by the accumu- 
ladon d knowldga with compilation following later. 
Clti~pter 4 eancms the qnesdon, of how m d c d  expert knowledge is 
repre@ntd, The m d i c d  Idcrmain is ch81:wtefizd by a wide variety of 
diseases which can be pre~el3itd to a doctor in m a y  different ways and 
which may tdce many different courses. In order to account for the ex- 
treme daptability of physician pesfomance, the 3iunawXdge clusters that 
msult from the cornpilation proclews mst  be enriched with knowledge 
concerning the patient chwactedstics that me associated with ctittclxing a 
&sax,  with the numerous ways a disease may manifest itself in a padem 
md with the incidence in W m n t  (sub)ppulations. 
Feltlovich md BmowsX mdd (1984) of medical expert bowledge 
has these chmcterristics. Feltovich and Barrows hypothesize that physi- 
cians when dliagnadng a padent try to activate and instantiate an illness 
script. Such m illness script describes the conditions in the patient and his 
car her mtdicd, h e d t q  or social background that may have contributed 
to the patient's p ~ w n t  disease (the Enabling Conditions), the disease pro- 
cess itself (the  fault)^, md the signs and symptoms that are caused by the 
disease and the cours'e it r a y  take (the Consequences). Rescmh by 
Schmidt, Hobus, Pate1 auld Bloshuixn (1987) suggests that there m dif- 
ferences between experts irnd int ates in the extent in w ~ c h  t ey rely 
on h o w l d g e  a b u t  Enabling Cond;i~ans in generating a plausible diag- 
nosis. This finding supprts the theory outlined ~bove. F d e m o l w ,  
Felc~vich and B a s  assume that m d c d  basic science haiwldge plays 
an hpmt role in the wnsmctim of the internal rep~mntatian, espe- 
cially when a finding in a patient deviates &om what is normally found in 
patients with that &seat+e. 
Eeltovich and Bmiows%mq describes the r e p ~ s e n ~ t i o n d  fomar 
that might result from the compilation prrscess that was hypofiesized in 
Chapter: 3 and from the enrichment md refinement of the howlledge with 
respect to multiple Enabling Conditions the Consequences lof a Fault. 
There is however one element in Rltovich and Bmows' thmry thatat di- 
verges horn the findings of the studies presented in the pmviams chapters. 
Their theory predicts that activation of m jllllness'saipt causes the mivation 
of the reIevant basic science knowledge. However, Experiment 2 showed 
that medical experts apply far less basic science knowledge than inteme- 
diates and novices do. 
In, Chapter 4 two experiments are described that we designed to shed 
solme light an these issues. Expehent  3 is a primarily explorative study 
with four su'lsjwts of differing levels of expertise ranging from a second 
year; m d c d  student to an experienced family physician. A think-aloud 
methadology was utili~ed. Its main abjective was to see whether experts 
really apply knowledge that is richer in Enabling C~n~ditions and more 
flexible in h e  Glionsquences of a disease. Both tmd out to be the case. 
The other: goal was to find out how subje~ts of different levels of exwdse 
apply basic-science knowledge in  ~leprewnting and solving a clinical case. 
Contrary to the prediction tbztt can be derived Erom Feltovich and B m w s '  
theory, it was found that in particular the less experienced subjects used 
basic-wience howldge  
The finding that the expert in this expe~rnena as compwed with the 
students actually applild nearly no basic-science: howledge at dl can be 
interpreted in three different ways: 
- the expert" basic-science howledge ha bmme mdimentq, or 
- the- expert's basic-wience h a w l d g e  still exists, but haw become inert, or 
- the expert's basic-science howlledge has k o m e  compiled and is inte- 
grated into the illness-script knowledge antat is applied while repregenking 
the case, hence lmvhg no m e s  in the 1Fhik-doud potmols. 
Experiment 4 was designed tcr investigate these three hypotheses, 
Twenty subjects of four levels of expertise, again ranging from second 
yeas medical students to family physicians, paticipatd. They were asked 
to diagnose a clinical case while thinking aloud. Afterwards they de- 
scribed the pahlophysiologicd process that under:slies the cage findings. 
These two data sets were cornpad. The results of this last experiment 
indicate that experts9mic-science hiowledge has not become inert or 
m&mg~tasgr but is oompild and integrated into the ibess-scl.igt howl-  
'edge b f  is applid wMe t ~ k i n g  doud. 
Fl~imdly, in Chaptm 5 the ~elmre&icaJ nodons that are unfold& in the 
earlier c h q m  we & a s s &  and 'irrou@t together info a theory on the de- 
velopmient af medical howledge. These t h m ~ c d  notions suppas &at 
t h ~  developmblf of n d c d  expertise is c h m & &  by several sages. In 
the f i s t  stage which roughly extends &rough the preclinical y e m  sf 
mdczll training, large mounts of howledge are xcumulatd Learning 
in &is stage seoulB in an elabomd h o w l a g e  base can;tru:~ng knowledge 
subout the m ~ c d  basic sciences m d  the clini~al sciences. This type of 
knowldge is s u ~ ~  to be rk:p~srnte;d in tic networks and mental 
miodels. When the student enters the clinic and begins his or her clerk- 
&hips, a new titage starts, Tlais stage i~ chmxef izd  by howledge com- 
pilation, edchment and refinement. The knowledge resulting from these 
smctmd clumges is ccmjwtured to be dually represented: in illness scripts 
and in semanblr: nets md mental models. Both layers we presumed to be 
in%patied, resulting in a knowledge base that allows for a flexible applica- 
tion of that hodedge.  
The m d t s  of the experiments presented indicate that illness scripts do 
not originate solely from knowledge campiladon and enrichment. Even 
the younger students seem to, apply mdirnentmy illness scripts while diag- 
nosing a case. The leming process rather seems to start at both knowl- 
edge layem at the same time, but with changing emphases. Findly in tme 
expert stage, m d c d  basic-science kniowldge seems to be compiled and 
integrated into illness-mipt howlledge. 
Fwtha analyses showed that the theory lacks a representational format 
to represent to memory traces of the patients who were in the past diag- 
nosed and treated by the student or the physician. Research by Norman et 
al. (1988) suggests that these memory traces are a pwedul  tool in diag- 
nosing a new patient. 
The model of medical expert lurolwldge that findly is presented in his 
chaptm consists of thee interrelated knowledge layers: hoiwlledlge a b u t  
the mledjc53.r basic sciences, represented in semantic networks and mental 
mdels; knowledge a b u t  diseases, the conditions enabling the acquisition 
af a disease md Ithe associated d symptoms, represented in illness 
scripts; md the memories about patients, represented in episodic 
mt3.mosgr &"aces. 
A student who has the task to acquire such a cmplicated h a w l d g e  
base runs the risk of averemphasizing one aspect at the cost of another. 
Especidly irn rfae clinical phase of rnecajcal education a student m y  concen- 
trate 013 -illness-script h o w  ledge neglecting basic sciences, which may xe- 
sult in undesirable effects peaaining to the amount of basic-science 
knowledge and the integration of basic sciences into illness scripts. The 
chapter ends with several suggestions on how to prevent this learning 
style, derived. from Collins et d. (in press] cognitive apprenticeship teach- 
ing modell. 
